What’s the difference between being informed and being educated?

What’s the line between learning something new and being taught something new?

Are news media and universities just two ways to do the same thing: gain knowledge?

As Coursera, Udacity, edX, and several other offerings begin to unravel everything we thought we knew about post-secondary education, we can’t help but make links to the world of news.

You gotta love the geeky name that applies to this new hybrid for-profit/nonprofit industry: MOOCs, or massively open online courses.

For top-rank universities, the embrace of online education promises to be transformational, upending many of the millennium–old rules of academe, as education, learning, certification, payment for services, and measurement of teaching effectiveness all inevitably succumb to major rethinks. For daily newspapers, themselves becoming mainly digital news products ever more quickly, it’s a time ripe for redefinition, for declaring new and expanded roles as the digital age removes long-ago built barriers — some real, some always imaginary.

At first glance, the question of whether professors and journalists are in the same business seems almost absurd, doesn’t it? We know what a college is, and we know what a newspaper is. One’s got ivy-covered walls, demands on-site instruction, costs tens of thousands of dollars a year, and grants certificates of completion, or degrees. The other is a physical, throwaway product that until lately cost a quarter a day and now can go at the top end — in print — for $650 a year. No prizes are awarded for reading daily — or for 50 years.

Online, though, these historic differences seem to fade rather quickly. We read to learn, whether it’s a course on European history or the latest twists and turns of current European economic drama. Greek tragedies of two different era. We read to understand and make sense of things.

What indeed, then, might media’s greater role in society be, and how can it now harness technology to multiply its impact? MIT, Stanford, and Harvard, among others, are wandering into that territory — testing the reach of technology — without knowing where their travels will take them in this terra incognita. We know that news media may be well suited to new educational roles. Why? It’s what we produce — information and perspective, building blocks of learning — and it’s what we believe when we talk about “public service.”

This emerging blur between media and education joins others. In its mischievous disruption, that’s much of what digital does. It blurs.

As the tablet makes mincemeat of the historic differences among newspapers, magazines, TV, and radio, we see another bright line ready to dim: that seeming line between what a news organization and what a college each do. This is still another stopping point for all those leading the craft of journalism into the new age to ask what business we’re really in. What business does it make sense for us to consider, test, or ply? What fits with our mission?

Let’s take “mission” for a moment.

Our history offers lots of punchy “raise hell and print the news” missions. But scratch deeper and you find a commitment to learning and its cousin, community building — one that reaches beyond simply pitching the news.

How about The Wall Street Journal’s simply elegant, “The daily diary of the American dream.” Or: “The Scotsman. It’s thinking time.” Or The Everett (Wash.) Herald: “If It Matters To You, It Matters To Us.”

While we all know about The New York Times’ “All the news that’s fit to print,” consider its deeper declaration: “The Company’s core purpose is to enhance society by creating, collecting and distributing high-quality news, information and entertainment.”

Beyond mere words, we can see small educational extensions of the news companies’ basic businesses. Most every paper has participated in Newspaper in Education programs, providing papers and, sometimes, lesson plans for elementary and secondary students. The New York Times sponsors many talks, lectures, and other learning events in the city. Education in the pre-online sense has long been part of its brand, and its Knowledge Network has offered “adult and continuing education opportunities.” Consider the Texas Tribune’s forays in events, both as a business line and a way of extending its journalistic raison d’etre beyond publication. Many newspapers sponsor candidate forums or public debates on an issue.

Largely, though, newsies inhabit an industry focused on the day. We trot out the well used quote, “News is the first rough draft of history,” but we let others make sense — and value — out of the incredible riches of newspaper archives. Let others create courses, connect the dots, and create knowledge. We’ve always been into a snapshot approach to the world. What’s news today lacks sufficient lineage to yesterday — or to tomorrow. We see such innovations as Storify and a few Google efforts (Living Stories, Timeline) that are efforts to connect the dots of news time.

All these efforts, though, are piecemeal, not intended as new ways of gaining mass impact, as in massive — think thousands or hundreds of thousands of people — open online courses.

So in the emerging age of the democratization of education, let’s consider how news companies could rethink their role in news, and education. Let’s call it the newsonomics of News U. [Update: I should have noted Poynter Institute's long-time and well-used News University, sometimes called NewsU, in the original post. The program, headed by Howard Finberg, offers more than 150 courses in journalism and multimedia. ]

Coursera, which has gotten a huge amount of press, is more than a collection of online courses. Working with the University of California, Princeton, Penn and, of course, Stanford, the Palo Alto-bred company has pioneered an “interactive online learning system.” Read its near-revolutionary mission statement of this Kleiner Perkins-funded company:

We are a social entrepreneurship company that partners with the top universities in the world to offer courses online for anyone to take, for free. We envision a future where the top universities are educating not only thousands of students, but millions. Our technology enables the best professors to teach tens or hundreds of thousands of students.

Through this, we hope to give everyone access to the world-class education that has so far been available only to a select few. We want to empower people with education that will improve their lives, the lives of their families, and the communities they live in.

What if we take the Coursera’s thoroughly democratizing aspiration and apply it to a modern news media company that wants to stake a greater claim to learning and community as part of its mission?

We are an entrepreneurial company that takes advantage of the best sources of news, information, and knowledge in our area to maximally inform our citizenry, at prices that bring civic literacy to everyone in our community. We envision a future where media and citizens work together, building on fact-based knowledge to better the community and tackle long-standing issues. Our technology enables us to broadly engage community as never before possible in building on community knowledge, feeding the democratic process of debate and decision.

We believe that civic learning and engagement are lifelong pursuits, and we are dedicated to using the most contemporary techniques, technological and otherwise, to empower people to improve their lives, the lives of their families, and the communities in which they live.

Too high-minded? Or is that simply another way of saying, with the aid of technology, what The Guardian, Journal, and Times first said more than a century ago?

What’s increasingly possible here — recognized by the pioneering elite educational institutions, but available to media institutions as well — is the ability to both increase the institutional reach of their brands and to provide transformational learning opportunities at small incremental cost.

Few traditional media have the know-how internally. One fascinating exception: U.K.-based Pearson. It owns the global Financial Times news franchise, Pearson Education is a leading K-12 publisher, and Penguin Books is positioning itself well to extend ebook links between “media” and “education.” While at Pearson, the press and the educational press share a home, most media will have to partner to test forays into learning, or to position themselves as Pearson does as “always learning.”

Beyond high-minded mission statements, what are some practical ways we can test media/education links? How about these to start:

• Build on in-depth series you’ve done or have in the works. Think of “courses” as an extension of the work. Pulitzer- (and other award-) winning series are naturals here and can take students into environmental science, health policy, hydrology, engineering, sociology, business management, and history, just to name a few academic areas.
• Take a page from One Book projects, in which communities settle on single books to read and discuss, by trying One Series courses that try to achieve maximum community reach. Topics like immigration, bullying and water planning come to mind, will draw new audiences.
• Add courses to the kinds of community engagement initiatives such companies as Digital First Media (and Steve Buttry, its leader in that area) are championing. (Thanks to Steve for the context and thinking, in his follow-up post.)
• Match up burgeoning ebooks initiatives (“The Newsonomics of 100 Products a Year“)  to coursework. Sell the book; provide the course at a low cost? Local history courses are a natural here.
• Think next-gen Newspaper in Education program. While some newspapers put real effort in bringing the news alive in the classroom, many long regarded it as just another way to add a percentage point or three to circulation numbers. What would a digitally revitalized, 2012 NIE program look like?
• Membership programs — think “you’re more than a subscriber to me” — are all the rage from Boston to L.A. Membership needs to have some real benefits, and news-based learning opportunities can be among them.

So where do media companies look for partners?

Consider that this is much more than putting words into lesson plans, or creating education replicas of news products. At the MIT/Harvard-based edX, video lectures, embedded quizzes, interactive learning, online labs, and much peer interaction. So these new MOOC companies themselves could be partners.

Other natural partners would be educators themselves, as school districts and community colleges, as well as the bigger, more prestigious colleges in the forefront of this movement.

The Knight Foundation — the funding pacesetter of the new journalism — should be of help. Its DNA is media and community-building. Just last Friday, Knight’s Eric Newton challenged journalism school educators to adopt a “teaching hospital” model to create greater community engagement and betterment. If transformative technology needs to be applied to enable media to become educators as well, maybe Knight would be a source of aid.

So where is the money here? Is there a business model to be found? The facile Silicon Valley answer may seem unpalatable to current newspaper company owners: Become more essential to people, and the money will follow. And what can be more essential, and more relationship-building, than lifelong education?

We see three other major web concepts in the business thinking of the MOOC founders: freemium, gathering data, and aggregation.

On business model, most MOOC courses are free to students at this point, a wonderful price point that brings in lots of customers, er, students.

On data, Coursera’s goal is to “analyze student data to obtain a better understanding of online pedagogy and student learning…and understand human learning at a scale and depth that has been never been possible before.” Think of the power of that data.

On aggregation, look at edX’s statement about the project, “The gathering of many universities’ educational content together on one site will enable learners worldwide to access the course content of any participating university from a single website, and to use a set of online educational tools shared by all participating universities.” Become the go-to source, globally, nationally or locally for something people value, and the digital world rewards you.

One other way we can look at building value and revenue here. Let’s take the prism of manufacturing. Publishers manufacture content (and ads), use it for a single purpose — the paper, the site — and then discard it. News is a raw resource, whose value is poorly amplified; better for publishers to move up the food chain and find higher-end uses for it in the creation of learning and knowledge.

Establishing new relationships and deepening old ones should create a future pipeline for products and services still to be born.

Forget Udacity — let’s think audacity. The audacity to think, in spite of news organizations’ shrinkage, they can make a larger, not smaller, contribution to their readers and communities.

Many non-profits, like NPR, like to tell the public that they are “mission-driven organizations,” words, I assume, that are meant to separate them from profit-seeking media. With news media profitability now only achieved by keeping the scalpel handy and well-oiled, the profit line works less as a defining difference. More important may be that, in comparison, much legacy news media seemsmission-free. It still exists, but in economic decline harbors increasing doubt about its own purpose. With self-doubt and its apparent clout receding, it has grown less clear about its role in democracy, rather than more clear.

Maybe a mission-based exhortation to adapt the technologies of the day to further community education, engagement and civic problem-solving is a tonic for the deepening media malaise.

Let’s let The Guardian’s C.P. Scott bring us full circle, reconnecting journalism and education.

Scott’s clear-eyed, pre-cable, pre-web view of what journalists — and educators — do rings even more important today: “Comment is free, but facts are sacred. ‘Propaganda’, so called, by this means is hateful.” In fact, one of the greatest shared values of the news and education industries is that both are fact-based enterprises, operating against longer odds as misinformation and disinformation can be funded on a different massive scale.

In 1921, he wrote:

A newspaper has two sides to it…It is a business, like any other, and has to pay in the material sense in order to live. But it is much more than a business; it is an institution; it reflects and it influences the life of a whole community; it may affect even wider destinies. It is, in its way, an instrument of government. It plays on the minds and consciences of men. It may educate, stimulate, assist, or it may do the opposite. It has, therefore, a moral as well as a material existence, and its character and influence are in the main determined by the balance of these two forces.

A billionaire philanthropist buying into the woebegone American newspaper industry does make a good story and prompts the usual question: Why? Does he something others don’t?

As Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway relieves Media General of its newspapers — “We’ve come to understand that most investors do not view the publishing sector as a place to generate the best returns on their capital,” Media General CEO Marshall N. Morton put it succinctly in April  – I think we can see this deal roughly in line with the spate of other newspaper deals that have gotten done in the last year or so.

Most of these deals do not rely that much on the actual value of the newspaper property. Rather than rely on other things — the value of underlying real estate has driven numerous of the deals – and the meager cash flow of the properties themselves is seen as a way to generate enough revenue to pay off low-interest, acquisition debt. In this deal, Buffett has taken more of a three-cushion billiards approach, much as the headlines announce “Berkshire Hathaway Bets Again on Newspapers with Media General Deal.” Each cushion rings up advantages for the company, even if the newspaper ownership itself is the most problematic.

Buffett is, at base, an opportunistic investor. See a business, or industry deep in the doldrums, and think you can leverage money out of a deal, one way or the other, and you’ve got an opportunity. The difference, if you are Berkshire Hathaway, you get a better deal than others, because of your financial capacity and willingness to take the long view. That’s what BH did with General Electric and Goldman Sachs, back when the world seemed to be ending in 2009. With that long-term position, he is perceived much more as an eagle than a vulture, yet he’s a predator nonetheless.

So, Berkshire Hathaway takes the newspapers off of Media General’s hands. At $142 million, he is buying 63 titles or about 21 actual “newspaper” properties. So that’s like buying a top-of-the-line house in each city, but you get a newspaper with with it. When the pool ball drops in the corner, BH Media needs to figure out a new game plan for those properties, one that I’ll bet will involve bringing a higher degree of technology application in cutting legacy costs faster and deeper.

It’s the early movements of the ball that make this deal more a feat of financial engineering than a newspaper deal. Three cushions provide investment relief:

• Lend Media General $400 million, and extend a $45 line of credit, at 10.5% interest. That allows Media General to escape shorter-term financial pressures, and gives BH a good profit along the way.
• Gain warrants that are convertible to about 19.9 percent of Media General’s outstanding shares. The new Media General is mainly a broadcast company, a sector with its share of issues, but with lots more projectable upside than the newspaper industry. So it’s gotten — as Buffett earlier got in General Motors and other “bail out” deals — a better deal than your average investor, as Media General re-charts its future.
• Takes title to all the real estate these newspaper companies sit on.

Now the new BH Media Group can move forward with its properties — where and how will the Omaha and Buffalo properties fit here?  – and unencumbered by debt or short-term pressures. If you are a long-term investor like Buffett, you can afford to give “newspaper” properties a breathing period.

He, as well as anyone knows that the future will be mainly digital, though it will slower to unfold in Lynchburg and Winston-Salem than in competitive major metro markets. He can be buoyed by the profound industry move to charging for digital access, after decrying free digital access: “Newspapers have been giving away their product at the same time they are selling it and that is not a great model. You’re competing with yourself… you shouldn’t be giving away a product you’re trying to sell. That’s key to the future of the newspaper. giving away a product free in one place that you charge for in another.” We now have enough evidence to believe that core newspaper readers will transition over their payments for “circulation” as they themselves move to tablets and other devices, if publishers approach the transition smartly.

The problem is print advertising is far deeper; it’s in an unending and accelerating spiral. No doubt he is buying — by bypassing Media General’s Tampa Tribune — profitable entities. Indeed, we may find out, looking back, that Buffett is just another greater fool, having believed his buy was close enough to the bottom to justify. Or we may see the code broken well enough on new business models, as the BH Media Group takes a long, hard look at the realities of John Paton’s Digital First Media initiatives, to manage downturn and change well enough to stay in the black. As that drama unfolds, it’s the profits from a Media General broadcast bet, loan interest and potential sales of real estate that buffett this deal from the harsh day-to-day reality of newspaper downturn.

By historical measure, it’s a strange move. A large newspaper company CEO is captain of his own ship, at a pinnacle of American company life and compensation. The Associated Press, on the other hand, has been something else indeed, a wire, about as unsexy as a news company can be. Retiring CEO Tom Curley came over to AP from his role as publisher of USA Today almost nine years ago. It’s been a helluva nine years of transformation, of turning the quite traditional company he inherited from long-time head Lou Boccardi into a modern news company. He got it part way there.

Now Pruitt takes the baton, as most reports paint a picture of night falling on one of America’s oldest industries. The Council of Economic Advisers has reported that the press is “America’s fastest-shrinking industry”, measured by jobs lost,” and the Financial Times headlined its recent newspaper round-up, “Bleak outlook for US newspapers.”

Why do it? Why trade in the sleepiness of California’s capital city (Sacramento is McClatchy’s headquarters) for the bright lights of Broadway, a long walk from AP’s NYC offices?

Number one on list may be McClatchy fatigue. Pruitt and his CFO, now-successor Pat Talamantes, have rowed the third-largest U.S. newspaper company oh-so-gingerly around the bankruptcy shoals that have grabbed more than dozen of their peers. They’ve had to make devastating cuts in staff and other expenses along with other companies, but get some points for greater efforts to keep newsroom size and spirit going in the face of that bleak reality. It’s important to note that McClatchy has found no special sauce in transforming itself for the digital age, performing on par, sometimes better, sometimes worse, than its peers. Pruitt is getting this job not on the basis on being a proven transformative player, but on being a known, highly respected news exec who understands the challenges of the times.

Almost exactly six years ago, Pruitt seemed like a big hope for higher-quality, newspaper journalism in the transitional print/digital age. On March 6, 2006, which seems like two eternities ago, McClatchy bought Knight-Ridder, then the second-largest newspaper company in the country, and my work home for 21 years through 2005.  Though Knight-Ridder’s quick demise was shocking, Pruitt’s commitment to journalism was reassuring. I remember the conference call the company did to tout the purchase, and the optimism and commitment in Pruitt’s voice:

“Opportunities like this come perhaps once in a company’s lifetime, and  we’re thrilled to have this chance to extend McClatchy journalism and our  proven newspaper operations to 20 high-quality newspapers in high-growth  markets. Our two companies operate in the finest traditions of American journalism,  devoted to independent, public interest reporting and the highest ethical  values. Combining the two creates a company particularly well-positioned to  lead the way in a changing media landscape. It’s truly a chance for McClatchy  to do more of what it does best.”

We hoped Pruitt would become a strong public leader for those values in this difficult age. Fending off bankruptcy, challenged by new non-family shareholders and consumed by month-to-month survival, that leadership went underground. There was little percentage in asserting journalistic values in that environment, it seemed.

So now: AP. Certainly, the company owns its own set of life-and-death challenges. The non-profit cooperative, owned by newspaper companies, is still somewhere betwixt and between a wire and a global media company.

One thing Pruitt trades in: a non-national company of diverse properties for a worldwide media play. In a word: Scale.

AP is one of the Digital Dozen companies I wrote about in the Newsonomics book. The digital business is all about scale: do something better than others and then take it out, at very low incremental costs, to the rest of the world. The Wall Street Journal, BBC, the New York Times, Bloomberg, Guardian and a half dozen others fit that definition; many will be the winners when we look back from 2020. Yet AP isn’t in that league.

Though only about 20% of its revenues these days (down from 40% when Tom Curley arrived in 2003) are paid by member newspapers, those newspapers control the direction of the non-profit company. Understandably, member/owners haven’t wanted AP to directly compete with them in the digital, death-of-distance age, but they’ve often been far stronger in what they didn’t want AP to do, than in what they wanted it to do.

AP’s been essentially a B-to-B company, with one of its prime customer revenue bases eroding so quickly. AP has made up part of that deficit by selling national content to web portals and upped its broadcasting and global businesses, but, like its owners, it has had to cut. The company’s made smarter investments in mobile lately, revamping what had been ho-hum, if early-to-market, iPhone and iPad apps. Those products offer glimmers of hope that the power of AP, and its members, can be realized by consumers. Mobile is the only area in which AP is going direct to consumers, with the goal of being the go-to site for news in the U.S. That’s a tall goal, with lots of competition.

So what should be at the top of Gary Pruitt’s to-do list?:

• In one word: Leadership. Yes, a sky (print) is falling. Yet, we’ve never more needed strong, courageous leadership in the news industry. What journalists — and not just those employed by daily newspaper companies — do is hugely importantly to their democracies and their communities. Tom Curley tried to make those points; too often his comments were received as those of the Old Guard simply trying to hold on. It’s not easy to change the conversation, but before the public, Congress and the industry, Gary Pruitt must step forward with an optimistic, inclusive view of the future of the news business.
• Embrace Big Story storytelling: Check out the new Big Stories section on the new AP Mobile app. It only contains five topics now, but its larger principle is important. AP is probably the second-largest company, by staff, in the world, with about 2700 journalists, second to Reuters’ approximate 3000. It made its reputation of getting it first, globally. That’s still vitally important. Yet, its ability to move beyond a commodification of sorts — for publishers, taking AP’s first story, then come behind it with a deeper story — is essential if it’s going to climb the mountain of value and charge more. As AP escapes from the age of Last In, First Out into a web of greater contextual value to its business and consumer customers, the more it can claim a place in that Digital Dozen.
• Master advertising: McClatchy is an advertising company; AP’s not. AP, if it is to be global player, needs to develop and bring in-house — quickly — advertising chops. Yes, its content-buying customers will sell their own advertising, but AP needs capacity to do that same, and not be wholly dependent on those buyers to create — and share value.
• Leverage global connections: The world’s news agencies employ 10,000 or more journalists among them. Collectively — if they were working even more closely together — that would be the largest journalistic workforce on the planet. Finding ways to leverage more and more any journalistic synergies (technology can help here) is an opportunity AP’s competitors don’t have. Some of those news agencies have found more alternative funding sources than others, though all are struggling with their core businesses. Learning from them is essential.
• Play paywall pool: With Lee’s embrace of paywalls, we’re now seeing pay systems become the default at U.S. dailies. Paywalls aren’t only a digital circulation revenue move; they reconfigure customer relationship and should force re-thinking of product portfolio. Consequently, figuring out where AP fits into the new paywalled world (and as more than in-front-of-the-wall, bulk-up-the-free content) has suddenly increased in priority.

By the end of this year, figure that about 20 percent of the U.S.’s 1,400-plus dailies will be charging for digital access. Gannett’s February announcement that it’s going paywall at all its 80 newspapers galvanized attention; when the third largest U.S. newspaper site, the Los Angeles Times, went paid this week, more nodding was seen in publishers’ suites.

More than a dozen dailies in Europe are charging, led by Finland’s Sanoma (see “Sanoma’s Big Bundled Success”), Axel Springer, and News Corp.’s Times of London. It looks like more than a dozen in Germany alone may be charging by year’s end. In Asia, the powerful Singapore Press Holdings is first out of the gate, with other dailies there planning to follow.

Suddenly it’s paywalls all around the world. We’ve moved — in a couple of years — from the question of whether to when. The big question that should be asked now: How?

Charging for digital access is a nuanced question. For smart publishers, it’s part of a much larger strategic shift, touching every part of their operations: circulation, content, and advertising.

Let’s look at the newsonomics of an increasing paywalled world. The well-publicized New York Times digital scheme has gotten most of the attention, but it’s a global news source — more akin to The Wall Street Journal, the BBC, The Guardian, and CNN than to regional and local dailies.

While the Times is a fledgling pay model success, we can’t say, broadly, that paywall models are widely successful. Most aren’t failures, but few can point to the significant revenue difference that The New York Times, WSJ, or Financial Times plans have made to their transitioning businesses. Why? And what are the emerging successful formulas?

First, it should be said that the sky has neither opened up into a dazzling blue future nor fallen. A couple of years ago, predictions about the impact of paywalls mostly fell on the doomsday side of the equation. About the same time that going pay was proclaimed as another sign of the imminent death of Old Media, some were poking fun at the new iPad as a big smartphone that no one would want to hold up to her ear. Time to chill on the whole doomsday storytelling — we’re all in for lots more twists and turns.

So if charging for digital access — a too long phrase, but one that’s most accurate than paywall — is neither a panacea nor a tombstone on the way to the inevitable, what is it? It’s a building block, and it’s a way to re-envision the business.

It’s about a major shift in strategy, says Star Tribune publisher Mike Klingensmith, whose paper went pay on Nov. 1.

“We’re changing the nature of the customer relationship,” he told me. “Instead of the website undermining pricing of your content, it supports the pricing of your content” — seizing on the profound difference the all-access revolution is beginning to make. Relationships don’t change overnight, and that’s one important lesson to draw here: If newspaper companies can do more than offer lip service about relationship and “membership,” they have the ability to recreate an updated version of the trusted, community-oriented relationship that the better dailies long held. If they can reinvent the relationship, they have a shot at transforming themselves (“The Newsonomics of Crossover“) as they move into the mostly digital era.

Let’s look at some of the metrics learned from the early pay period, in talking with a number of the business executives who have been at the forefront of this grand experiment.

The big bogeyman of digital ad loss

The first big question that’s been laid to rest is the journalistic corollary of the Hippocratic Oath: Do no (advertising) harm. Remember the big fear about “going pay”: Would a paywall decrease digital visitors so much as to harm theonly part of newspaper publishers’ businesses that’s growing, digital advertising? Metered models, like The New York Times’ (“At Almost 400,000 Digital Subscribers, Inside the New York Times Pay Strategy, Year 2″) and the Los Angeles Times’, are now the trade’s standard, having been advocated strongly by Press+ when it got rolling in 2009. Allowing 10-20 free articles a month has meant that traffic loss has been minimal; given the near-infinite amount of digital ad inventory, such traffic loss has had practically no effect on digital ad sales.

“All of the almost 300 publishers now using Press+ have kept their online ad revenues because we use data to make sure there is plenty of ad inventory to meet advertiser demand,” says co-founder Gordon Crovitz of Press+, which was acquired by RR Donnelley last year.

Even if some papers experience a small negative impact, new digital revenue quickly outpaces it. “In our first month of paid service, online subscription revenue was 3x the network advertising we lost because of the drop in pageviews, and our online subscription revenue has grown every month since,” says Andy Waters, general manager of the Columbia Daily Tribune in Missouri, which went pay on Dec. 1, 2010.

Pageview loss has ranged as high as 40 percent (at the Columbia Daily Tribune) and has typically run about 10-15 percent. Interestingly, from Minneapolis to Columbia to Hamburg, traffic often begins to grow markedly after the initial shock of a paywall. It may take months or a couple of years, but traffic is essentially reset and can then be rebuilt. Clearly, the most important readers — core readers who really use the news product through the week — have stayed the course.

The flipside of a tougher paywall is a higher signup rate, and more revenue, from those valuing the content.

Remove one major fear.

Selling more papers

One reason some papers went pay: Try to reduce the number of subscribers fleeing print. So far, there’s been a minimal impact on retaining subscribers, or “reducing churn,” as it is called in the business. The Memphis Commercial Appeal’s publisher Joe Pepe points to a 1 percent increase in Sunday home delivery, similar to what The New York Times has found. In Minneapolis, the Star Tribune has gotten 20 percent of its 15,000 “digital-only” subscribers to pony up an additional 29 cents (!) a week to get the Sunday Strib.

The Sunday sale is a major part of the how we see rolling out. At the Strib, it’s an inside-out, outside-in offer. If you only take the Sunday paper (subscribers who get two or more days of the paper delivered get free digital access), you’ll get a low, introductory rate to add digital access; if you’re a digital signup, you’ll be pitched on the 29-cent deal.

The L.A. Times is putting its own spin on the Sunday deal: pay 99 cents a week for the first four weeks (and $1.99 thereafter) to get free digital access and the Sunday paper. Want just free digital access only — that’ll cost $3.99 a week. You don’t have to be a coupon professional to figure out the better deal. The LAT approach mimics the NYT approach, which charges readers about $60 a year more if they refuse to take the Sunday paper. Maybe we should call it the Godfather offer.

How much will Sunday (“The Newsonomics of Sunday Paper/Tablet Subsciptions“) grow, given such pricing — which I expect more metros will adopt, given that they still have relatively weighty, ad-revenue-rich Sunday papers? The first job is to stop the Sunday bleeding, and if combined digital/Sunday products do it, consider it a tourniquet that publishers hope to get a couple of years out of, even as daily print circulation continues to decline. The Sunday angle — the Sunday paper angle — is a big one.

New money

While The New York Times is on a double-digit circulation (print + digital) revenue trajectory, other papers are having a hard time reaching that number. Columbia points to a 5-6 percent lift, enough to cover several newsroom positions for the small daily. Minneapolis points to a 3.75 percent lift, based on its new $1.5 million revenue stream, earned at $100 a year (or $2/week) from 15,000 digital subscribers. Others say the circulation revenue is flat to a little up.

One little secret of the trade: the opt-out. Build in higher pricing for combined print and digital access, and allow readers to take print only — if they affirmatively opt out. Eighty percent or so won’t opt out, and so we’ve seen high retention rates among newer subscribers.

The wild card here is how much the all-access offer — part of the changing customer relationship the Star Tribune’s Mike Klingensmith suggests — allows papers to price up their overall print/all-access subscriptions. He says the paper priced up its overall subscriptions 9 percent last spring, with little negative impact, the first time it had priced up in recent memory. Another increase is in order for this fall.

That’s the big key here, I think: If you tell customers “we’ll get you our content however, wherever you want it” — and deliver on that proposition with products that match the tablet and smartphone age — the creation of added value makes sense to readers. So it’s important to look beyond digital-only revenue itself, and look at the total reader-revenue-producing potential of smart pay plans.

As Gannett points to a goal of adding $100 million in new revenue, which would be a 10 percent circulation rev boost overall, look for as much of that to come from upward pricing in general as new digital-only subs themselves.

That said, it’s useful to pay attention to a new emerging metric: what percentage of a newspaper’s site unique visitors are signing up for digital access-only subs. The New York Times broke the 1 percent barrier last year, 390,000 subs compared to 33 million U.S. unique visitors. The Commercial Appeal is at .8 percent; The Star Tribune is at .25 percent with its four-month initiative. The Columbia Tribune is at .2 percent. It’s just one metric, but one that tells us about comparative traction. Though, it seems like a tiny number, it’s not. Fly-by traffic, supplied by Google and now Facebook, supplies so much traffic that about 3 percent of most newspaper sites’ unique visitors equal their paid print circulations. The digital-only conversion metric provides an apples-to-apples comparison, even as overall print/digital circulation impact remains key — and is measured in that old standby, dollars, euros, and pounds.

The goal here: Head to 50 percent of overall revenues being paid by readers.

These numbers are only a snapshot and come from some of the better practitioners of the digital pay craft. Many more are underachieving. The point is that there is an emerging playbook of how to get pay working right.

For now, let’s boil it down the how to 5 P’s:

• People: As in customers. Few newspapers — probably a dozen or fewer in the U.S. — know their combined print and digital audiences as a single audience. It takes a lot of technology moving to get a single, whole view of a customer, matching the subscriber database with the digital registration database to get a holistic view. Without that view, it’s tough to operate a modern, somewhat digital/somewhat print business — and maximize the value of new pay propositions. The New York Times, the Star Tribune, and the Commercial Appeal are among those who do, and papers as small as The Day are getting there.
• Product: This is a simple question of content. How much strong local coverage are readers missing after a half decade of staff cuts? The better a news organization covers its community, the more it can dare to charge and still get customer traction. Some papers may simply have already cut too much.
• Presentation: Consumers — us — understand the all-access pitch. News (and magazine) publishers have to make it real. That means real ready-for-the-tablet (and smartphone) products, app-based and HTML5. Replica-plus products will satisfy paying readers less and less over time — and won’t compete with Flipboard-esque experiences.
• Pricing: Enough said. Newspaper (and magazine) pricing has been fairly dumb over the years, a follow-the-leader, seat-of-the-pants exercise. Playing with the value equation, print and digital, requires both testing and matching of new value to new price.
• Promotion: More than just marketing, the new promotion makes better psychological sense of the all-access proposition to older and newer (and younger) customers.

So 5 P’s — or maybe more.

“You have to do eight things right,” says Gregor Waller, a former exec at Axel Springer and now CEO of Digital Age Consulting, who is in the midst of advising a number of major media globally on pay models. “It’s like a golf swing. If you miss out on one, you can’t hit the ball correctly.”

It’s easy to get cynical about hyperlocal news on the web. People have been working to figure out a scalable model to support it for years. But news-model fatigue shouldn’t be mistaken for permanent failure — it’s just that no one has yet found success.

Community journalism pioneer Steve Buttry, now heading up community engagement at Digital First Media, says he is buoyed by disruptive-change theorist Clayton Christensen’s notion that 90 percent of successful startups start out with the wrong strategy and often take three or four attempts to get it right. That makes some kind of web sense. For those of us trained in the arts of journalism, though, it’s probably a tough lesson: We’re trained to get it right thefirst time.

With that in mind, let’s look into the next round of hyperlocal, the emerging newsonomics around Patch’s aim to become profitable, just as Digital First Media (DFM) dials up its own hyperlocal strategies. Though many newspaper companies are testing hyperlocal strategies, individually or through their chains, Patch and DFM stand out for the scale of their intent. We’ll stick with the term “hyperlocal,” even though it’s a squishy one, because it still best describing the kinds of close-to-where-we-live school news, local sports, police reports, and government coverage we find useful. It may a community of 20,000 or 80,000, but for many of us, it’s less than a whole city.

Let’s start with Patch. Each quarter, as AOL announces its financial results, CEO Tim Armstrong sticks his head in the boxing ring, and lets it get punched around a bit. He took over a newly independent Time Warner spinoff and has been madly transitioning it beyond its sinecure of the old-timey Internet access business.

I won’t debate here his hits and misses, his romancing of Arianna (or was it the other way around?), or the half-life of AOL, given its trajectory and the fact it haslost more than $800 million since its 2009 spinoff.

For the news business, two facts stand out. First, Patch is doing journalism, employing more than 1,000 journalists. Second, it is testing a model that needs testing, however Patch’s history is eventually written.

That model may be getting a rocket boost of revenue, if January’s trends hold up. In an interview last week, Patch President Warren Webster says that January booked ad revenue alone equaled half of all of 2011 ad revenue. If that trend were to continue, we’d be looking quite differently at Patch’s chances of making it into the black before AOL’s investor patience runs out. Just last week, Starboard, an “activist fund,” increased its AOL stake to 5.1 percent, pushing for strategic changes, and Patch is in the middle of its sights.

[Update, 2:52 p.m.: Some added context to the Patch ad revenue increase: The January ad revenue noted above should be noted as bookings for the year as a whole, committed by January. Further, Patch says that, as of today, it now has commitments for more than 75 percent of the total revenue that it recognized in 2011. Those are ads that it has sold and that will run some time in 2012. It recognizes the revenue, like almost all ad sales companies, when ads run. Indeed, January 2012 is up manyfold over January 2011, but in terms of the yearly revenue contribution, it will be relatively small given that January is a light ad month throughout the industry. While it's impossible to extrapolate whole year 2012 revenue, based on the data so far, the sharp turn up in trajectory portends a major boost in ad revenue in 2012 — how large and how sustainable, still to be seen.]

That model may be getting a rocket boost of revenue, if January’s trends hold up. In an interview last week, Patch President Warren Webster says that January ad revenue alone equaled half of all of 2011 ad revenue. If that trend were to continue, we’d be looking quite differently at Patch’s chances of making it into the black before AOL’s investor patience runs out. Just last week, Starboard, an “activist fund,” increased its AOL stake to 5.1 percent, pushing for strategic changes, and Patch is in the middle of its sights.

AOL won’t release specific Patch financials, but we can piece together numbers — Patch CSI — that tell us the story so far. AOL has said publicly that one quarter of its 864 sites are making $2,000 a month or more of revenue. That would also mean that 645 or so of its sites are making less than $2,000 a month in revenue.

On revenue, let’s be generous and say that one-quarter of the Patch sites are making an average of $2,500 per month. That would mean $30,000 a year. So 215 (or one-quarter of the sites) at $30,000 kicks up to $6.45 million annually.

Let’s say that on average the other three quarters of sites are earning an average of $1,500 a month, or $18,000 a year. Multiply that by 645 and we get $11.6 million.

So annual 2011 revenue would come in at about $18 million. That matches up with other extrapolations, guesses, and the like, which put the number around $20 million.

We know that AOL is spending $160 million a year on Patch. So on an operating basis for 2011, total revenue of $18 million would leave Patch with a $144 million operating loss.

But wait. If January was that good, equaling half of the 2011 revenue rate, that would mean Patch took in $9 million in that month. If it could sustain that number all year, it would be up to $108 million in revenue. Yes, its sales cost would increase, so let’s add in another $20 million for those. If all the other costs were constant, 2012 costs would be $180 million. 2012′s revenues would be $108 million.

You could look at that number two ways:

— It would still be losing $82 million a year;

— It would have erased 43 percent of its operating loss in a year.

A Patch half-green, or a Patch half-brown.

On the green end is Patch’s maturing approach to ad sales. For instance, Webster is enthusiastic about its recent initiative to add a third leg of revenue, in addition to national impression-based advertising and largely sponsorship-based local advertising.That third leg is better monetizing of its directories. “In the last two months, we pushed our sales team to push claims.” “Claiming” is getting local merchants to verify their free business listings. Of course, the next step is to get them to advertise and to enhance those lists. “We hit an all-time high recently,” he says. “We got 400 claims in a single day across Patch.” Patch says its claimed-listings rate is up roughly 124 percent over the past six weeks.

The big potential payoff here: Claiming is lead generation, and Patch has found claiming merchants to be 4 to 5 times more likely to advertise once they claim. These enhanced directories offer video profiles, highlighted listings and “owner messages.”

Journalistically, what does Patch have to do to win a race towards profitability, a marathon that will probably last at least three more years? Fundamentally, it needs to fulfill its promise: “Hi there, we’re Patch, your source for local knowledge you can’t live without,” a promise it curiously makes on its overall entry page, but not on its town sites.

If I were giving out grades, I’d give many sites As and Bs for vitality and enthusiasm — and those are good starters in journalism. The better sites do give us a sense of townness, a tribute to the reporters running ragged around their geographies, snapping photos, doing quick interviews, promoting Patch, and more.

In news, they’re in and out — no real competition to good daily newspapers, even with their diminished staffs. They’ll hit on good stories here and then, but can’t be depended upon to do it. I thought that the March 2011 acquisition of Outside.In would lead quickly to better news aggregation from other local news producers — creating a better local news briefing — but so far I see scanty evidence of that.

Blog posts are increasingly numerous — Patch is up to 14,000 active bloggers, Webster says, or 16 per site on average. But they run a wide gamut in quality and readability.

In utility, Patches are hit and miss. Lots of local events can be found — to the gratitude of civic-minded organizers of them — but the presentation isn’t the most user-friendly.

As sources of finding a good new restaurant or a handyman or the best child care in my neighborhood, they fail. The city guide vacuum (“The newsonomics of the Swift Street Courtyard“) — still left in place after the Sidewalks, Digital Cities, Real Cities, and more have come and gone — is a market opening for Patch. Yet its directories are utterly generic, not distinguishing an above-average eatery andJack in the Box (“Whether you’re looking for a quick bite for breakfast, lunch or dinner, or a late-night snack, this Jack in the Box, conveniently located on Ocean Street near Water Street, is ready to serve you 24/7. You’ll find favorites such as cheeseburgers, Sourdough Steak Melts, Chicken Fajita Pitas, shakes and fries, as well as specialties that include a chicken teriyaki bowl, deli trio grilled sandwich and grilled breakfast sandwiches. Salads, tacos and a kids’ menu are also available.”)

That may explain the recent hiring of Rachel Fishman Feddersen, late of Bonnier’s Parenting.com, and an early city-guide staffer, way back in 1995 for New York City’s Metrobeat, which was later bought by CitySearch. A feature pro and a mom in Montclair (once the hyperlocal capital of the country, when Patch, Baristanet, and NYT’s The Local competed there, and now still deeply competitive even after the Times pulled out), she’s into her second week on the job. She told me that her job as chief content officer will range from “the unsexy stuff” — things like page load times, better SEO, newsletter-sending time — to showcasing Patch best practices to coming up with winning editorial features.

Patch is also experimenting with new more visually interesting designs in a couple of dozen markets. Webster acknowledges that the directories in particular and other parts of the site “are not yet built out.”

What else might AOL and Patch do to close the profit gap faster? It could grow its audience more quickly by better connecting Patch to other relevant parts of AOL. Huffington Post, for example, doesn’t automatically recognize local visitors and give them easy access to a local Patch site. Find the “Local” tab, and you can choose one of HuffPo’s city sites — but there’s no Patch content to be seen. That seems like a no-brainer. Further, a dedicated tablet app (rather than the 2x smartphone product) seems like it should be in place by now.

“Everyone wants us to fast-forward to the end of the movie,” Webster notes. He has a sensible point. Given how each Patch rumor — two sites consolidated here, freelance budgets cut back there — is treated as forensic evidence, Webster is in relatively hardy form. He admits that Patch, with its fast expansion, took too much of a one-size-fits-all approach to site deployment, and was too “cookie cutter.” Some of the changes in budgeting — for instance, devoting some site budgets more to marketing awareness and less to paying stringers — derive from overall understandings of the market; others attempt to learn that needs in West Des Moines are different than in West Orange.

That’s only fair, I think. Whether the moves have been right or not, it makes sense to tweak this hyperlocal business and journalism model, and each change shouldn’t be a cause for suspicion. Let’s remember that at the same time Patch may be cutting out freelance dollars here and there, daily newspapers are continuing to remove dozens of full-time jobs.

Further, as Buttry points, it takes time to get things right — though it’s not clear how much time Patch has, given growing competition.

Advertising competition is ubiquitous, with Google, Facebook, and Yahoo all taking new runs at local treasure. Buttry’s Digital First is making moves of its own. The company, which is making itself famous for developing dozens of new local, digital advertising products, is now in a couple of big Patch territories, particularly Connecticut and California, as Digital First digs deeper into MediaNews management in both Northern and Southern California.

People increasingly will compare Patch and Digital First. Says Buttry: “We get a lot of attention because of the geographic overlap, and we have big ownership [Alden Global Capital, in Digital First's case]. But we are transforming whole newsrooms, not setting up one-person shops.” Digital First’s Connecticut Group Editor Matt DeRienzo outlines the coming competition even more directly, pointing to the strengths of his Connecticut test lab in Torrington, a model soon to spread to Oakland and New Haven, with numerous variations elsewhere. He makes three points — ones that all legacy newspaper companies would have to use against insurgents like Patch:

• “A larger staff, and a newsroom structure with reporters who have editors on site leading and counseling them;
• 134 years of history covering the community (and in Torrington, we opened our entire archives for free access to the public, one of the most popular features of the newsroom café);
• A physical gathering place that is built more like a community center than a newsroom (free public meeting space for the Garden Club, Little League board of directors, Young Republicans, etc., classes and workshops for the public, open story meetings, etc.).”

And yet: Digital First, at this reading, has about 1,000 bloggers within its cities, compared to Patch’s 14,000.

Then there’s the overlap question: Aren’t these guys doing the same thing? Well, sorta, kinda. Buttry even says Digital First could reach out to Patch, offering a partnership or aggregation arrangement of some kind, though he hasn’t done that yet. “We should include them in our local networks.”

So it’s not David vs. Goliath, nor David vs. David, nor Goliath vs. Goliath. In fact, these may be two Davids both fighting against the Goliaths of Facebook and Google, which are rapidly gaining digital ad market share on everybody. It’s just another front in the digital wars, one perilously close to our homes.

Let’s look this week at the journalistic turmoil in the world’s eighth-largest economy: California, a.k.a. the Golden State (beta motto: “We get post-IPO Facebook capital gains taxes — you don’t”).

The massive changes we’re seeing in California journalism portend even faster journalistic change across the country. We Californians like to believe we’re always at the birth of the new new, from Hollywood to Silicon Valley. Certainly, that’s been true of news change — and now that change has greatly accelerated, doing spins, free falls, reversals of fortune, and lots more. It’s not really change — it’s chaos. No one can tell what the journalistic landscape of the state may look like in, say, 2014. All we can say with certainty: we’re witnessing the death and life of California news.

Who will own the biggest news media? Who will manage the biggest news media? How much of a life in print will be left for newspapers as they go digital? And, of course, how many journalists will be paid to get the news to the state’s 37 million residents and to the rest of the country? Already, well over 1,000 daily newspaper journalists have lost their jobs over the past five-plus years.

How many new combinations — among news entities formerly known as newspapers, broadcast, and digital news startups — will emerge and grow to scale? Those combinations are already beginning to tax legacy imaginations, and as of this week, we’ve got a new intriguing model to add to the mix.

The promise of California Watch’s model

Tuesday, we saw a new model birthed: the friendly takeover of one digital news startup by another. California Watch, the almost-three-year-old statewide-oriented model of a modern news agency, is merging with Bay Citizen, the two-plus-year-old Bay Area-oriented news startup, which has had more than its share of birthing pangs.

Both sites were born in the depth of the recession and a relatively dark period of Bay Area journalism. (See “Bay Area Online News Renaissance: 7 Pointers Forward.”) Both hired talented staffs (from voluminous applications) and won journalism awards. Yet California Watch, built on $5 million in foundation funding, developed under the wing of the Center for Investigative Reporting (itselffounded way back in 1977). It has prospered, grown, and earned quick legitimacy and even respect from the state’s major media, which run its stories. CIR, which has long focused on investigative pieces of national import, is now largely synonymous with California Watch; it’s one organization made up of 30 journalists (writers, editors, producers, data analysts, and more) and nine other staffers.

We’re seeing in the merger the greater strength of the California Watch model. Call it B2B (business-to-business), a statewide news agency re-imagined for this century. It’s a model being eyed by journalists in some of the other 49 states: Produce muscular, multimedia journalism once (with a little tailoring of stories by market) and distribute it to many news outlets, from Voice of San Diego to KABC-TV in L.A. to the San Francisco Chronicle. These news distributors pay small sums for the stories, but the money is adding up. Increase the flow of journalism, in the Bay Area specifically and California more widely, and the networking “new wire” importance of California Watch grows, especially as struggling dailies continue to cut their own content-originating staffs.

Bay Citizen foundered on leadership and strategic disagreements, on personalities, on the editorial priorities muddied by the otherwise-valuable feeding-stories-to the-regional-edition-of-The-New-York-Times program, and more. That’s all history now.

CIR/California Watch executive director Robert Rosenthal, and his former boss at the San Francisco Chronicle, Phil Bronstein — the two served as managing editor and executive editor, respectively in the last decade — now face strategic and operational decisions on how best to put together the combined nonprofit. Bronstein, who has served as president of the CIR board, now serves as the executive chair of the merged organization, in part owing to the last wishes of the Bay Citizen benefactor Warren Hellman, who died unexpectedly in December. Two long-time daily newspaper guys, now able to build a new news model outside the constraints of constant cost-cutting and legacy hand-wringing. The foundation is set, with such stories as “On Shaky Ground” (“The Newsonomics of California Watch’s Single Investigative Story,”), which won over many editor skeptics.

For the moment, the big news out of this move is this: the potential to establish a new local model of scale and capacity. California Watch/Bay Citizen will be able to move forward with an editorial staff of more than 50, providing a scale that’s been needed to fill the yawning vacuum of local and statewide coverage. National investigative nonprofits from ProPublica to the Center for Public Integrity have stepped up their work, in volume and value, as newspaper-based coverage has slipped. In America, though, it’s a local-to-statewide news — across the 3,500-mile expanse of the country — that’s been crying out for bigger, new models to build on the successes of the MinnPosts and Texas Tribunes.

MediaNews dives into Digital First

The merger isn’t the only big news news in the Bay Area; it’s just the most public.

MediaNews — the largest news publisher by circulation in the state, with more than 30 dailies and great strength in the Bay Area, north of the Bay Area, and in greater L.A. — is about to be shaken to its Dean Singleton foundation. Singleton built the company, deal by deal, and assembled a coalition of willing executives to run the businesses and newsrooms.

They clustered, they cut, and they maneuvered through bankruptcy, and now their leader has been pushed into retirement, replaced by the wild, private-equity-bankrolled revolutionaries from Digital First/Journal Register Company (JRC). CEO John Paton and company moved rapidly (especially in newspaper time) to turn the financially and editorially bankrupt JRC upside down, lopping legacy costs, shooting voluminous video, opening newsrooms, and jettisoning anything and everything that didn’t smell of local.

That’s easier done in New Haven and Macomb that it is in San Jose and L.A. Applying faster, digital-first fixes to larger newsrooms and newspaper operations offers a complexity of challenge that will makes good drama for the rest of us. Expect to see rolling retirements of the Old Guard, with Denver Post CEO Jerry Grilly already announced.

Reorganizing newspapers on paper (or computer) is one thing — the new management knows its toughest and first challenge can be summed up in one word: culture. Yes, after the newspaper industry has been half-sized, culture, good, bad, and silly, is usually the first challenge new management faces in pushing change.

As MediaNews’ California properties change, they’ll change the landscape around them. Expect differing kinds of new competition and new potentials for unorthodox partnerships. Partner up, in fact, the MediaNews turmoil with those of another high-profile experiment: Patch.

The hyperlocal shoot of AOL, it has made a big bet on California. Of its 800-plus sites, 132 are based here. Many of the sites are lively, with good features, calendars, and lots of local, if episodic, bloggers — even if the sites don’t come close to living up to Patch’s tagline: “Hi there, we’re Patch, your source for local knowledge you can’t live without.” AOL, of course, won’t release traffic data, but its latest financial report showed that its $120 million investment isn’t close to bringing in enough ad revenue. That’s confirmed by checking on the sites (national ads prevail) or attending a local Patch-sponsored community meeting, as I did last Friday. Second question from the audience: “Why don’t you have local ads?”

Given Digital First’s open-newsroom strategy and philosophy, Patch is particularly vulnerable to the MediaNews changes. MediaNews can do what Patch is doing — and cover the news with more than single reporter/editors. Or MediaNews properties could partner with Patch.

Don’t think that Bay Area media change is restricted to text and print. KGO Radio, the market’s long-time talk leader, saw its talk line-up of multiple decades jettisoned one night in December — to public uproar, where else, but on Facebook — as it embraces the all-news (broadcast and digital) mantra and goes head-to-head with KCBS.

Public radio on the move in L.A.

Moving briefly to the south, we can see that the change is only prologue.

If Californians like to be first, they can be the first to claim one metro area with three — count ‘em, three — bankrupt daily newspapers. That would be metro Los Angeles. Both MediaNews (Los Angeles News Group, or LANG, with holdings like the Daily News, the Long Beach Press-Telegram and the Pasadena Star-News) and Freedom Communications (Orange County Register) fell into bankruptcy and emerged quickly from it, with banker and private equity owners. Then last summer, the two tried to mate, as Alden Global Capital, holding about 40 percent of each, tried to arrange an arms-length (tough to negotiate with yourself within the bounds of law) marriage and somehow failed. Tribune’s Los Angeles Times entered bankruptcy in December 2008 and has yet to emerge from equity owner/bondholder hell. Those three companies continue to gyrate in the marketplace, maneuvering within their increasingly limited options.

With L.A. Times publisher Eddy Hartenstein assuming the Tribune CEO title as well last spring, the Times has been shaking up its strategy and management, edging into its own digital-first territory. One clue: the November appointment of a quartet of new VPs tried to find new harmony in digital revenue. They include Jennifer Collins from Variety and Andrea Nunn from HBO, giving an indication the newspaper company is trying to stretch well beyond its roots. They move in as long-time Times chief revenue officer John O’Loughlin moves out, having just assumed the president’s job in a exec-suite reorg at the Houston Chronicle.

Among the Times’ many options: a flipping-the-switch bet that would have it abandon some print to cut costs and become more heavily digital faster.

Ahead of still more staff cuts, the Times lost its change-oriented editor, Russ Stanton, in December — and then saw him hired by public-media mover KPCCas VP of content. Even a few years ago, that would have seemed a bizarre career move. The editor of The Los Angeles Times goes to lead the news effort at a local public radio station?

Yet when you compare the two enterprises — today — you see one in decline and one believing in its own upside.

Yes, The Los Angeles Times still has (today) 500-plus newsroom people, and KPCC can claim fewer than 60. But as the Times cuts, though, the Southern California Public Radio (SCPR) board has given the go-ahead to double its newsroom to more than 110 by July 1, 2014, needing to raise $24 million over four years to do it. Already raised toward that goal: $8 million so far. Already hired: 20 people in the last year. For 2012 alone, the plan is to bring in at least 13 more news positions — including producers, editors, bloggers, and hosts.

Those numbers are curious ones, but still seem small. Don’t, however, under-estimate SCPR president Bill Davis. Davis is a public media exec in the mold of his mentor Bill Kling, the Minnesota Public Radio visionary entrepreneur who first outlined how public radio could become public media and move into the local news vacuum. In fact, MPR, through its joint parent American Public Media subsidiary, is a sibling to KPCC.

Davis knows how to raise money, and he sees the journalistic devastation that’s enveloped his city. Add that energy and ability to the mix and the journalistic arithmetic begins to change. Five hundred newsroom people at the L.A. Times sounds like an army. Peel off the parts of that army that are devoted to sports, entertainment, and the production of content (as opposed to the creation of it), and you may be down to a couple of hundred who report the local news.

That local news — sans entertainment and sports — is what the expanded KPCC plan aims at. So let’s say that KPCC could get to 100 (Kling’s magic number) in the next several years, as public-spirited citizens (a la Philadelphia and Chicago?) chip in to create and sustain a local news alternative. Let’s say the Times continues to reel, run aground on the shoals of legacy costs, and its newsroom, already dispirited, trims down to 150 local news creators. As Rick Santorum said not long ago in Iowa: Ballgame.

Finally, let’s head to the border. There, the San Diego Union-Tribune, worth a billion dollars a decade ago, has been sold twice in three years. This time, local developer Doug Manchester bought it and promises to turn the newspaper of record in California’s second biggest city into a booster sheet. Across town, online startup Voice of San Diego — a California Watch affiliate which just had to cut staff due to budget cuts — has recently partnered with the local NBC station for news coverage.

Mix ’em, match ’em. It’s a Mating Game that seems like it could only come out of California.

What’s your signature content?

Quick: If somebody buttonholed you in an elevator, a school play, or a bar, and said, “Why should I pay you for that?” — what do you tell them?

Each passing week, it seems we’re further into the age of signature content. That only makes sense: If the death of distance is now old news, if everything is available everywhere at the touch of button or the swipe of a finger, then what makes any news or entertainment brand stand out amid this plague of plenty?

Closed systems — from three or four TV networks to less than a dozen big movie studios to a half-dozen major magazine publishers to geographically dominant newspapers — made signature content less important. Sure, big shows and big names have always driven media to some extent, but now, media without big names or big shows are going to get lost in the ether. Take Hulu’s announcement last week about Hulu Originals. You do have to wonder if Hulu’s fictional 13-episode “Battleground,” about a dysfunctional political campaign, will be bested by the Republican reality show in progress when the show debuts next month. Hulu is also bringing a Morgan Spurlock series for a second run, and probably will feature one other new program. The Hulu announcement joins Netflix’s own foray into signature content. Three years ago, would the thought of Netflix signing up Little Steven to do an original comedy series have crossed anyone’s imagination?

Hulu and Netflix both need to distinguish themselves in the market — not only from each other, but from Comcast, DirecTV, and Time Warner, among others. They need to buy protection as supposed masses consider cutting the cord on packaged services, Roku-ing and Apple-enabling Internet video onto their living-room screens. In movies and TV, we’re quickly morphing from a world of news and entertainment anywhere — get all of these things, somewhat haphazardly (Comcast Xfinity, for instance) on all of our devices — to one in which consumers ask, “What special do you have for me, in addition to my all access? Yes, All-Access, the cool feature of 2011, will quickly graduate from a wow to an expectation.

Why as consumers should we pay $7.99 (down from an initial $9.99) to Hulu Plus, when the same stuff (kinda sorta) is available through Boxee, or Apple TV, or Netflix, if I can find it? Why am I paying $7.99 a month (apparently the magic price of the moment) to Netflix for a catalog of films that is both voluminous and too often lacking what I want? Consumers are going to be asking that question a lot more.

Publishers, distributors, aggregators, and networks all want more money, and they’ve seen — courtesy of tablets and All-Access — that consumers are now more ready to pay for digital content than ever before.

Forget “content wants to be free.” Now content wants a fee. And everyone from Time Inc to The New York Times to the Memphis Commercial Appeal to Hulu’s co-owners (Fox, Disney, and Comcast) see gold. They see another digital revenue stream, in addition to advertising or to cable subscription fees. Yet they are increasingly believing they’ve got to up the ante (and Hulu is raising new funds to buy original programming) to compete and to win those consumer dollars.

News companies — at least one in ten U.S. daily newspapers and many consumer magazines — are rapidly embracing digital circulation revenue and All-Access. Yet results have been quite uneven. That makes sense: Consumers will pay for digital news, feature, and entertainment content, but they don’t want to overpay, and they’ll increasingly be forced to make choices. Buy this; let that go.

Let’s be clear. Paid media is paid media, and the original-programming pushes of the video companies have great meaning for news and magazine companies, global to local. For them, the calculus is similar. News and magazine brands can launch new products, though that’s out-of-their-DNA-tough for many. So they’ve focused primarily on sub-brands, many of which are people. These are the faces of news and magazines; many of these have become hot commodities over the last several years (“The Newsonomics of Journalistic Star Power“) as companies try to distinguish themselves — and give readers and viewers a reason to pick them out of the crowd.

How, though, can media companies afford to pay a premium for branded, promotable talent, talent that may open consumers’ pocketbooks? That’s easy: spend less on other content. So we’ve got the rise of user-generated content, obtainable free or cheap, and all kinds of new syndicate action from Demand Media to startup Ebyline (and maybe NewsRight), all trying to make it cheap and easy to get more medium- and higher-quality content more cheaply. What’s old is new again — as a young features editor, I got regular visits from syndicate and wire salesman, ranging from high-quality to the Copley News Service, that sold its stuff by the pound.

Another prominent model no news or magazine company can afford to ignore: The Huffington Post. Back to the early days when Betsy Morgan first teamed up with Arianna, HuffPost has worked this evolving content pyramid. At the top, a few highly paid site faces, many opinionated faces (some paid, most not), and then low-cost aggregation, much of it AP, headlined with the site’s recognizable swagger.

Then, of course, there’s the old standby: staff cutting. We’ve seen lots of staff cutting. In fact, these days, while we see some announcements like Media General’s big Tampa cut, most of the bloodletting is less public, but no less real. If you need to pay more to stars, and ad revenues are still declining, staff cuts of less than premium content (and those that produce it) make economic sense (“The Newsonomics of the New News Cost Pyramid“). It’s the new news math.

These newsonomics of signature content are getting clearer. Netflix is planning to spend 5 percent of its expenses — or $100 million a year — on original, Netflix-defining content. Hulu is spending about a quarter what Netflix’s total, or $500 million in total, on all content licensing this year. We don’t know how much of that is for original content, but observers believe “Battleground” will cost $15-20 million for its 13 episodes. With its other forays, it will probably spend closer to 10 percent of its content budget on original content.

Curiously, many newspaper newsrooms constitute only 10-20 percent of the overall expenses of a daily newspaper company. So we’re starting to see some new, and old, arithmetic play out here.

Simply, Andy Forssell, Hulu’s SVP of content, explained the cost/benefit ratio to Variety: “…having an original scripted series that hasn’t been seen anywhere else yet is considered the best tool for standing out with either advertisers or viewers.”

As usual, we see the bifurcation of the bigger national brands — those with more audience to gain and more money to spend — and local news brands. While many local newspapers have cut to the bone, with too much of the tissue in the form of experienced, name-brand metro and sports columnists cajoled or drummed into “early retirement,” we see increased branding of stars at places like Time, The New York Times, Fox News, and ESPN. The sports network may be the classic business model of our age, and in its anchors and top analysts — many initially lured from daily newspapers — it has shown the way for many years now.

At the Times, consider business editor Larry Ingrassia’s build-up of business columnists, from veterans Gretchen Morgenson and Floyd Norris to new(er)bies Andrew Ross Sorkin, Brian Stelter, David Carr, Ron Lieber, and David Pogue. And the Times more recently picked up James Stewart from archrival Dow Jones.

At Fox News, Roger Ailes has cannily built the most successful cable news operation not on the interchangeable blondes that provide so much fodder for Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert, but on O’Reilly and Hannity.

At NBC, the news franchise is so built around Brian Williams that his well-received newsmagazine “Rock Center with Brian Williams” is synonymous with its host.

At Time Warner’s CNN and Time, we see the building of a worldly franchise on Fareed Zakaria’s clear-eyed, no-nonsense view of our times.

And then there’s the more local and regional press. Newspapers have long believed that it wasn’t any one or a half-dozen names that sold the paper. They’ve believed the news itself was the star, and the daily information report was the brand. That may be still be true of the Times, the Journal, the Financial Times, the Guardian, and a handful of other national/global news organizations — all of which have substantial, multi-hundred newsrooms that produce branded, unique products. It’s less true of regional and local dailies, many of which still present too much commoditized news in national, business, entertainment, and sports coverage, and have bid goodbye to many faces familiar to readers. Those that have retained familiar faces must do what they can to keep them; all need to recruiting more.

Then they may have a good answer to the question, in one form or another, consumers and advertisers will increasingly ask: What’s your signature content?

2. Didn’t CNN’s coverage of the Iowa Caucuses illustrate our screens future? John King has been the King of the Screens, and we can remember when his magic-touch screen seemed wildly innovative. Now in the touch-screen era, it was all screens all night — save Wolf Blitzer’s classic utterance of “OMG” in seeing Romney go up by a single vote — and CNN newbie Erin Burnett brought the right slapstick spirit to the uncertain screencraft. She whooshed one image off one screen on to the next one, sometimes successfully. CNN’s use of data, even as limited as it was for this election, showed how much we’ve moved beyond the world of still print infographics. The marriage of analytics and screens from tablets to livingroom monitors is forever changing how we take in information.

3. If AOL crumbles in one direction or another, what’s the future for smart cookie Arianna Huffington, who has parlayed personality and business model into an enviable perch in American journalism? Who might pick up HuffPo, one of the easiest-to-define business lines in journalism? How much will its relatively low rate of ad return (“The Newsonomics of ARPU” deter buyers? With the emergence of a broad international strategy (10 new editions) – “We’re now re-expanding back into a list of countries”, said CEO Tim Armstrong Tuesday – it becomes a more interesting play.

4. With Alibaba hot on the Yahoo tail, how much should we wonder about the future of big aggregators stocking up on a professional journalists? AJR estimated that Yahoo has hired about 200 journalists and AOL 250 (not counting the Patchers). Those hundreds have produced some pretty good journalism, particularly with sports scoops, and have proven that the term “as first reported by Yahoo,” isn’t a joke. The question of Chinese ownership is a knotty one (interesting Fortune take on American hypocrisy, here), but we have to ask questions about how free a journalistic corps would be under Jack Ma leadership. It might be well and good to uncover U.S. football corruption, and that’s a growth sport itself, but what about wider public policy coverage? For AOL journalists, the questions are even gauzier. With AOL’s deepening financial questions and investor pressure to cut back on non-profit-producing business lines, how long will there jobs be maintained, under current or potential new management/ownership?

5. Won’t be 2012 be the age of All-Access perfecting? Time Inc is among those getting its tablet act together well, with Time Magazine a fairly slick tablet app. In December, the company made a foray at convincing print subscribers that connecting the print sub with digital access is a good idea. The sign-on process is fairly straightforward, and seems to hold session to session, unlike some others. Yet, subscribing to more than one Time Inc. product — Time Magazine and Sunset, for instance — has to be done twice. Expect that kind of obstacle to be eliminated going forward. All-Access will be real all access, made easier for consumers. And All-Access is even trickling down very local as the Monterey (Ca.) County Weekly heralds its all-access availability through public radio sponsorship. Getting All-Access right — pricing, real tablet- and smartphone-appropriate apps, customer ease, giving subscribers cross-title benefits — is one of the biggest tasks for news and magazine publishers this year.

6. How could a single person be empowered to send a message on behalf of the New York Times to eight million people? The Times’ your subscription-is-ending embarrassment email showed the company at its worst in detecting and handling a crisis. My larger question is how, in any scenario, a single person has the unchecked power to send a message to eight million people on behalf of a big brand? The culture of checking and doublechecking (yes, the sorry Judith Miller tragedy aside) is so deeply ingrained in Times’ DNA. Why isn’t it part of the wider culture, especially in the one-click age?

7. What’s more local than language? The Times profiled Wordnik Sunday. It’s an innovative modern language company making the most of digital technology to surface new and real meaning of our living language in this fast-changing age. Noted in the story is that the Times and News Corp’s Smart Money are using Wordnik for glossaries? As local media look for ways to really be more local, knowing and presenting more about place is essential. So what about using something like Wordnik to create local language guides? It’s a small idea, perhaps, but one showing how even local media need to make more use of digital tools if they are to make future claims of relevance to local audiences.

8.Hasn’t Gail Collins turned out to be a just-right-for-the-times replacement for Frank Rich? Rich’s rich prose and panoramic view often left us breathless in its sweep, and well deserved a Pulitzer. Yet Collins — a New Yorker who recently pointed out that “John McCain came in fourth in 2008, with the support of 15,500 Iowans. This is approximately the number of people who live on my block” – has brought a Hee-Haw sensibility perfectly suited to the Wonderlandia of the Republican primary scene.

9. With a call-out to Ken Kesey, isn’t 2012 the year when you’re either on the cloud … of off it?

There’s an algorithm out there, we can be sure. It’s got all the components of business success for news-creating companies, each value carefully computed and relational to the others. Yet, approaching 2012, the algorithm hasn’t been found. We have but shreds of numbers, beacons of numerals that portend models, but can’t prove them out.

2011 has been a remarkable year. We can point to three major phenomena that profoundly changed the news landscape this year. Each offers up its own half-formed metrics for that magic formula in process, and each has dramatically changed the possibilities of news, each largely positive:

• The transcendant transformative age of the tablet: The first real replacement device for print swept aside doubters, netbooks, and much conventional wisdom before its second birthday. More than one in 10 American adults owns one, with that number likely to more than double in the next two years. Those owners are readers, spending lots of time with news, single brands, and longer stories.  (“The Newsonomics of the Missing Link“)
• The dawn of digital circulation: Forget “paid content.” Forget “paywalls.” It’s the back-to-the future age of circulation: paying for news and magazines that we depend on, no matter how they are delivered to us. All-Access reinforces our relationship with news and magazine brands we like; ubiquitous access (print, online, tablet, smartphone, soon connected TV) allows us to justify paying for convenience as much as the content itself. Publishers are still experimenting with how to get the paid proposition right, but those that do now have a potent second digital revenue source — and that’s a business advantage digital-only competitors lack.
• Social curation joins editorial curation: We knew that Facebook, in particular, and “social” more generally — including Twitter, LinkedIn, most-emailed lists and our own individual sharings — were changing how we all decided what to read. Now, though, social curation is being built into the best publishing models. Why should each of our own personal quests be a virgin start-from-scratch idea when many consumers/searchers/researchers/shoppers (some of them people like us) have tread there before? So social intelligence, gleaned from mountains of data, is becoming a required part of the companies’ product development and consumer experience. Facebook is in the catbird’s seat as that world develops.

Those three game-changing phenomena offer major drivers of change — but not models. For publishers, the near-term is just getting harder and harder; witness Media General’s major cuts of this week in Tampa (16 percent workforce reduction) and elsewhere. Major cuts are happening this month and into January, as publishers gird for another 5-12 percent decline in ad revenues. Continuing profitability can only be achieved by cutting.

Publishers, publicly or not, are embracing the Digital First mantra of John Paton and Clark Gilbert, the industry’s dynamic duo, who put on another show at BIA/Kelsey this week. Everyone’s into the deconstruction/reconstruction of their companies; some are faster, more adroit, and more public about it.

As that reconstruction moves forward, the new magic formula may seem simple: reconfigure costs and revenues. Yet, working the in-between — most publishers still depend on print for 80 percent of their revenues — is hardly formulaic. Building the new cost structure and the new revenue structure, in tandem, with changing audiences and advertising spending habits, is the fixing-the-moving-car-at-65 MPH scenario publishers face.

With that speeding car in mind, let’s look at some of the numbers that will go into that magic formula, when it’s finally perfected. Mix, match, blend, and extrapolate:

5-15 percent: That’s the percentage of many news sites monthly unique visitors that drive half or more of their pageviews. That’s a jaw-dropping number, and one that news companies are just beginning to acknowledge — privately. Why be quiet about it? Look at the annual reports and quarterly financial disclosures of the public companies; they trumpet uniques and pageviews. Yet in the age of news ubiquity, we’ve reached near-infinity in pageviews and of ad inventory. Is there much meaning left to one random web visitor hitting one random web page, courtesy of Google or Facebook, some time in any given month? Not much. Yet, that’s what most people still point to publicly. Privately, the question is the 5-15 percent. These are your customers. How much will they pay for access? How much more valuable are they to targeting advertisers, given you know much more about their reading and shopping habits? The metric needed: How much does a core customer yield annually, and in a lifetime? Then: How do I most efficiently find and convert more of them?

35 percent: That’s the percentage of print readers who will transition to tablet-only by 2014, believes one prominent news company, which is using that forecast in its business planning. High? Low? What’s your number?

$544 a year: That’s a Newspaper Association of America number (from 2009) for the revenue value per unit of Sunday circulation. What will a tablet customer be worth, combining subscriber and ad value? Get that answer right and you can try to accelerate, or slow down, your readers’ embrace of the tablet.

10-20 percent: That’s how much of national news company traffic now comes from mobile; Facebook already says that 35 percent of its use comes from mobile. Yet, in the U.S., only three percent of digital revenue comes from mobile. That’s a huge gap — the audience is way ahead of the money — and it will be closed over the next several years. In fact, in the age of expected anywhere access, “mobile” will disappear as a category. Big issues for publishers: dividing what kinds of revenues can be wrung from tablet (now lumped into “mobile”) and from the brain extensions in our pockets and pocketbooks, the smartphone.

One billion: That’s one estimate of how many smartphones will be shipped worldwide in 2016. It’s a continuing curve upward from the almost half-billion shipped this year. U.S. smartphone penetration is about a third of cellphone owners; so there is lots of headroom for growth. (Singapore’s the first to cross the 50 percent threshold.) Big challenge for news and magazine companies: coming to terms with how to make money on that little screen: advertising, sponsorship, All-Access subs, and more.

63 million: That’s the number of smart TVs that will be shipped in 2011, up from 43.6 million in 2010. 2016 forecast: 153 million. Smart TV is just the next screen, joining the tablet and the smartphone, providing us ubiquity. When WSJ Live (“The Newsonomics of WSJ Live“) — the company’s model-breaking tablet product launched this fall — it included launch partners Samsung and Vizio, leading smart TV makers. This is the beginning of the next wave.

$2.75: That’s the average ad CPM, or cost-per-thousand rate gotten, at one top 15 news sites. Average rates have been going down and are likely to continue doing so. High-targeted and high-branded (combine the two, and you’ve got the best of both worlds) audiences continue to outpace average sites and average inventory. It’s less and less good to be average.

22 percent: That’s the third-quarter increase in U.S. digital ad revenue. Digital ad growth accelerates as print declines more rapidly; in the U.S., it is now surpassing newspapers to become second only to TV. Worldwide, expect the industry to hit $80 billion this year. Within that ad spend, publishers have access to less than half: Paid search continues to be about half the market, with publishers getting only a tiny slice of it. Display/banner ads — publishers’ strongest suit — account for 23 percent of the total. Video is growing 42 percent a year. Performance-based business models (as opposed to selling impressions) now command 64 percent of the market. (Most data from IAB.) So, in all the areas of growth, news and magazine publishers are weakest. Despite uneven digital ad results reported by newspaper and magazine companies, it’s not that the money isn’t there — they just haven’t transitioned their businesses enough to compete for it.

$13 billion: That’s the amount of retail ad revenue the newspaper industry in the U.S. took in for all of 2010, and it’s down this year. Retail makes up roughly half of all newspaper companies’ ad revenue. In a new, circle-the-wagons attempt to hold on to it, ShopCo, a consortium of eight of the large newspaper companies, is building out a new local shopping portal. FindnSave, tested first by McClatchy, should be up in 250 larger markets by the middle of next year. Will it be good enough and big enough, to satisfy both consumers and merchants? (“The Newsonomics of Google’s retail push“)

25 percent: So if a reader drops print and embraces the tablet, and digital access overall, how much savings can a news company achieve? It no longer has to print and deliver a paper, but it still has the costs of maintaining a staff, maintaining distribution, and maintaining a plant. So maybe it costs 25 percent less to fulfill that customer’s access? In this long interim with hybrid digital and print reading, how much of their production costs can companies cut out? The long-term question: At what point can the news industry make a major shift, as most reading becomes digital and a minority of it in print?

56.7 percent: That’s the percentage of downloaders of the Guardian’s new Facebook app who are under 24, with 16.7 percent 17 or younger. For a news industry decrying the lack of young readers and focused on aging baby boomers as the core audience, the Guardian’s early experience is phenomenal. It’s well and good to sell All-Access to long-time print readers; it’s essential to bring in new ones, and Facebook looks like a great bet.

7: Daily means seven days a week for newspapers, right? MediaNews is dropping Monday printing at some Northern California papers. Michigan remains the epicenter of the non-daily daily. Following the 2009 cuts in metro Detroit, Advance is now going digital-first with smaller papers there, with several becoming three- and four-day print “dailies.” The idea: keep 85 percent of print ad money and radically reduce print costs. Publishers take a very deep breath and hope they aren’t cutting the print cord too soon. Expect to see more of such day cuts in 2012 and beyond. It’s a hybrid strategy, and as we see its impacts — on print ad revenue and on digital reader and ad transition — we’ll have new numbers to plug into the model.

> 1 percent: Google now makes 54 percent of its revenue outside the U.S., as does Apple. Such international orientation is a major differentiator in the economy of the day, and not in the publishing and digital industries. Even The New York Times, with impressive global reach, gets only a percent or two of its revenue internationally. In the last year, we’ve seen The Independent (through Press+) selling U.S. access, PBS launching a British channel, and the Guardian relaunching an American foray. Digital media knows no national bounds, but monetizing outside home countries has been difficult. Breaking through this barrier could create significant upside for top publishers.

It looked like just more head-butting among the mammoths of our time: Google will match up with Amazon, said the Wall Street Journal last week: “The Web-search giant is in talks with major retailers and shippers about creating a service that would let consumers shop for goods online and receive their orders within a day for a low fee.”

Most of the stories played on that Goliath vs. Goliath theme, and of course that’s an increasingly familiar one as the businesses of Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple overlap, intersect, and collide. Who is a bookseller? Well, Amazon, and Apple, and Google, kind of. Who is selling and renting media — well, who isn’t or preparing to do so? Who is in the hardware biz — all except Facebook? Who’s reaching for the digital ad riches, now generating $80 billion worldwide; Google, the king, and Facebook, the fast-threatening prince.

Yes, the Google/Amazon match-up over delivering goods is a good and real storyline. As big brains butt, it could be thunderous and landscape-changing. That landscape includes the news business, and you can almost feel the rumbles underfoot just with the word of Google’s move.

Let’s look at the newsonomics of Google’s would-be one-day-shipping program — let’s call it Google Tomorrow™© — and its wider impacts and strategic rationale. First, we’re talking about a lot of potential money. U.S. retail e-commerce is forecast to hit almost $200 billion this year, with the global total adding up to $700 billion. So there are many companies trying to get in the middle of it.

The idea of website-facilitated buying — and shipping — from fairly local retailers isn’t a new one by a longshot. Storerunner plied this territory, too early, a decade ago. Webvan, the best funded of the grocery deliverers went from brilliance to punchline in about 30 seconds. Shoprunner is currently out there, pitching the same idea as Google Tomorrow. Newspaper companies have been more steadfast, more the tortoise in the race for perfection of our emerging online/offline commercial world.

Companies like the Gannett-owned ShopLocal and independent Travidia, with its FindnSave product used by McClatchy and other news chains, have been building the know-the-local-retail-inventory, compare-prices-and-buy terrain for years. Unlike what Google may do, they don’t deliver one-click buying and delivery. They offer product selection, availability and then click off to retailer’s own sites for buying and shipping or store pickup. The idea seems like a great one, a merger of the best of online and offline, yet it’s been slow to grow. Every time I’ve checked out the sites, I’ve found the promise smart, but the inventories too uneven or the hierarchy of results skewed to preferred shops — not mypreferences. Consumers have clearly opted for Amazon over these kinds of sites.

The impact on the ShopLocals and FindnSaves is not what should concern newspapers, though. The big issue: retail advertising.

While the web has greatly damaged newspapers’ classifieds and national ad businesses, retail has been a relatively stronger area. Worth about $13 billion last year — or half of daily newspapers’ ad revenue — it’s a lifeline at this point in the tough print-to-digital transition. Retail is being challenged on several fronts, with the Sunday preprint business a big concern. In fact, both Google and newspapers are pursuing e-circulars to counter the inevitable print downturn in that area.

Wait a minute, you may say — that $13 billion is advertising money and Google, like Amazon, wants to make money facilitating actual commerce. But the division between advertising and selling is an old one, fast blurring. Think about where we’ve come from the era of impression-based (newspaper, TV, radio, magazine) ads into the era of pay-per-click, pay-per-lead, pay-per-acquisition, and more.

Retailers don’t want to advertise; they want to sell stuff.

Give them new routes to sell stuff, and deliver it more cheaply than they could before, and they’ll migrate their ad/marketing/lead generation dollars. So if Google can really make it easier to personalize, routinize and make more efficient the selling process, it will place itself between the seller and the buyer. As it does that, it replaces the newspaper as middleman, further reducing much of the revenue that is keeping newsrooms staffed, even if many of them are now half-staffed at best.

Is the replacement of newspaper as advertising-oriented middleman inevitable? Probably, but over a longer term. Since the dawn of the web, people have been chasing the perfection of commerce, and it’s been a tough slog with far more losers than winners. Amazon, of course, is the big winner, but with relatively small profits, a paltry $63 million in the last quarter on sales of $10.8 billion. While Amazon is perfecting commerce, it’s got a long way ago. Since it was born in 1994, four years before Google, it has built a one-of-a-kind business on customer obsession and brilliant analytics. Its recommendations engine is ready for the web hall of fame, and its latest foray with Prime membership (“The newsonomics of Amazon’s prime moves“) shows it knows how to build on its foundation.

Google lacks some of Amazon’s core strengths. It’s a mix-and-match technology company, famously trying lots of things and at times more quickly abandoninglosers. In commerce, Google is moving forward with a spate of moves. Google OnePass is a restyled content buying system, with some prominent publishers signing on. Add in Google Latitude, Google Local, Google Local Shopping, Google Shopper, Google Tags, and Google Places, all relating to local commerce.Google Offers is gaining steam and is working with publishers on syndicating local daily deals.

There’s an irony to such publisher partnerships, of course. On the one hand, Google is a “partner,” magnifying publisher businesses through its ad and search products. On the other, initiatives such as Google Tomorrow are a potential dagger to newspapers’ jugular. That’s the way of the web world. For Google, or Amazon, or Apple, or Facebook, any new initiative it takes on has its own internal logic. Should another industry — say newspapers — be wounded in the process, it’s just collateral damage. Given the size of these digital behemoths, as they decimate legacy industries, you can almost hear them say, “Sorry, did I sideswipe you? I didn’t feel anything.”

If everyone is a frenemy these days, and Google is taking on Amazon, media companies have to ask: Who is the frenemy of my frenemy?

One last point to ponder about Google Tomorrow. Consider it, in part, adefensive move.

If, in fact, selling and advertising are blurring, Google has to move more in the selling direction. Right now, it’s an ad company, pure and simple. About 97 percent of its revenue comes from advertising (and you thought newspapers relied too much on that revenue source). It has brilliantly moved to expand its digital ad dominance (now taking in about 40 percent of the dollars in the U.S.) by merging its paid search foundation with big acquisitions in display advertising and mobile. Just last week, the feds let it buy AdMeld, an ad optimizer — and Google’s 57th acquisition so far this year. Now, the Doubleclick ad management system offers a singular approach, incorporating in one place display, search and mobile, to the delight — and terror — of publishers and others in and around the ad industry.

The dominance is a sight to behold. Yet as digital innovation continues to disrupt everything in its path, the ad business is vulnerable, with companies, led by Amazon trying to eliminate the cost and friction of finding buyers. So let’s look at the Google Tomorrow battle plan as one aimed at Amazon surely, but with ammo that may hit newspapers as well — and one that may allow Google to find that big, elusive second revenue stream.